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 ﾠ
Essentially	 ﾠRational	 ﾠAnimals	 ﾠ
Matthew	 ﾠBoyle,	 ﾠHarvard	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠ
—Forthcoming	 ﾠin	 ﾠRethinking	 ﾠEpistemology,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠG.	 ﾠAbel	 ﾠand	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠConant—	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠdisposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing’s	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
likes:	 ﾠunderstanding,	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠawareness,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠindifferent	 ﾠto	 ﾠme,	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthese	 ﾠterms	 ﾠto	 ﾠname	 ﾠdiscrete	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠor	 ﾠmere	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠ
levels	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠpowers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠpowers;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
whole	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠsensing	 ﾠand	 ﾠcognizing,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcognizing	 ﾠand	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠ
nature…	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠof	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠquite	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠorientation	 ﾠand	 ﾠunfolding	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠpowers.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ J.	 ﾠG.	 ﾠHerder,	 ﾠTreatise	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOrigin	 ﾠof	 ﾠLanguages	 ﾠI,	 ﾠ§2	 ﾠ(2002,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ82-ﾭ‐3)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
1.1	 ﾠ According	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠreaching	 ﾠback	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠas	 ﾠfar	 ﾠas	 ﾠAristotle,	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
set	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠother	 ﾠterrestrial	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrationality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOther	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠtradition,	 ﾠare	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠsensation	 ﾠand	 ﾠappetite,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠthought,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsoul.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠbeings,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
distinctiveness.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠholds,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠadd	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠor	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠand	 ﾠefficacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠmental	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠalready	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠin	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠcreatures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠtransforms	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠmental	 ﾠ
powers,	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminds	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals.1	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Although	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠroots	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠrun	 ﾠdeep,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfair	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠregard	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsuspicion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠone	 ﾠdoubts,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠare	 ﾠall	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdays	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle,	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐pervading	 ﾠdifference.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠphilosophy	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠmind	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠmind’s	 ﾠdistinctiveness	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠwould	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠspeak,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠof	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠof	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠ(psuchē).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠour	 ﾠword	 ﾠ
“psychology”	 ﾠdescends	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠword,	 ﾠand	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“mind”	 ﾠ
permits	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠits	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠon	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠconcern.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠfit	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠmentality	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
conceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠcontinuous	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmentality	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠto	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
like	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠpiece	 ﾠof	 ﾠnaturalistic	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠby	 ﾠcalling	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠ
“rational,”	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠmind	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
species	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠarisen	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠevolutionary	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠalso	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminds	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ“nonrational.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cognitive,	 ﾠbehavioral,	 ﾠand	 ﾠneurophysiological	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
animals,	 ﾠand	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ“rational”	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠthink	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠdeviate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdictate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
seem	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecialness	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠas	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠdegree,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind.2	 ﾠ	 ﾠJerry	 ﾠFodor	 ﾠexpresses	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthought	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠdirectness:	 ﾠ
[T]he	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠmore?)	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠminds	 ﾠmight	 ﾠstrike	 ﾠone	 ﾠas	 ﾠunparsimonious…	 ﾠ	 ﾠSurely	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠreasonable,	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠ
contrary	 ﾠevidence,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheirs	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠquantitative.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠare	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
evolved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer;	 ﾠand,	 ﾠindisputably,	 ﾠour	 ﾠbabies	 ﾠturn	 ﾠinto	 ﾠus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgap	 ﾠ
can’t	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimpassable	 ﾠin	 ﾠeither	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Fodor	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ16)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.2	 ﾠ The	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustifying	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠit	 ﾠdraws,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠcould	 ﾠeven	 ﾠamount	 ﾠto.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠit	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠposit	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠkind”	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
animals?	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠa	 ﾠloose	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠwherever	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠthings	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠnonrelational	 ﾠproperty.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠone	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠtypical	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠmind	 ﾠdiffers	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ(e.g.)	 ﾠa	 ﾠtypical	 ﾠchimpanzee	 ﾠmind	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtoken,	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
inclined	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠbig	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠminds	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠminds	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠshould	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbe	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminds	 ﾠof	 ﾠchimpanzees	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠorangutans,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontinuities	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠprimates,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
instance	 ﾠTomasello	 ﾠand	 ﾠCall	 ﾠ1997.	 ﾠ	 ﾠStandard	 ﾠworks	 ﾠon	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠbiases	 ﾠin	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠNisbett	 ﾠand	 ﾠRoss	 ﾠ1980	 ﾠand	 ﾠKahneman,	 ﾠSlovic	 ﾠand	 ﾠTversky	 ﾠ1982.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
dolphins?	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhy,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠthey	 ﾠbe	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠone	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠanother’s?	 ﾠ	 ﾠEach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠinquiry	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠpsychology,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“cognitive	 ﾠethology,”	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
variations	 ﾠin	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠability,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠmerit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
absolute	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational/nonrational	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtraditionally	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
command.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ There	 ﾠare	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠimages	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠinterest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Jonathan	 ﾠBennett,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠbegins	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbook	 ﾠRationality	 ﾠby	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠgloss	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠminds	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠcreatures:	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠbelieved…	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenius	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠstupid	 ﾠman	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
smooth	 ﾠslide	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠstupid	 ﾠman	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠape	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsharp	 ﾠdrop,	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠjust	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠno	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠintellectually	 ﾠhalf-ﾭ‐way	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠapes	 ﾠand	 ﾠstupid	 ﾠmen,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
creatures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAny	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠintellectual	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠwas	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠapes	 ﾠand	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠmen—so	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠruns—either	 ﾠwould	 ﾠor	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthat	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
puts	 ﾠhumans	 ﾠimportantly	 ﾠabove	 ﾠother	 ﾠanimals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Bennett	 ﾠ1964,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ4)	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind	 ﾠis	 ﾠevocative,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
think	 ﾠit	 ﾠclarifies	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
creatures	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠintellects	 ﾠstand	 ﾠhalf-ﾭ‐way	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠapes	 ﾠand	 ﾠmen	 ﾠjust	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
insistence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational-ﾭ‐nonrational	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠexclusive:	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠcreature,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ
either	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠrational	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠstipulative,	 ﾠan	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠline	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcontinuum.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠan	 ﾠexclusive	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠover	 ﾠsix	 ﾠfeet	 ﾠ
tall	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠof	 ﾠsix	 ﾠfeet	 ﾠor	 ﾠless,	 ﾠcalling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ“tall”	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠ“non-ﾭ‐tall”;	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠpurposes,	 ﾠit	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmark	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintended	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠit	 ﾠseem	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdiscontinuous.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠsteam	 ﾠengine	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
combustion	 ﾠengine,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠa	 ﾠsharp	 ﾠbreak	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
continuous	 ﾠtransition:	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠcontinuum	 ﾠbe?	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdifference,	 ﾠ
although	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠsignificant,	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
inevitability	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational/nonrational	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠis	 ﾠtraditionally	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.3	 ﾠ I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠemphasizing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠminds	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠclarification	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
assessed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsupplying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠclarification	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠstraightforward	 ﾠtask.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠtask	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠoverlooked	 ﾠby	 ﾠboth	 ﾠfans	 ﾠand	 ﾠdetractors	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPeople	 ﾠhostile	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠhere	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠmarshal	 ﾠa	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠbattery	 ﾠof	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠit,	 ﾠas	 ﾠFodor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠasking	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
claim	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“difference	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind”	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠequally,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠsympathetic	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠidea	 ﾠoften	 ﾠrush	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠis,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
specification	 ﾠthey	 ﾠgive	 ﾠshould	 ﾠcount	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Any	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠevaluate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠminds	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠ
ones	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠby	 ﾠasking	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠkind”	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational-ﾭ‐
nonrational	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠamount	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifference?	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠessay	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
contribution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠbut	 ﾠessential	 ﾠtask.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠwriters	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
distinguished	 ﾠrational	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠminds,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdepth	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠclaiming	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistinction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠby	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠa	 ﾠsketch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutlook	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rational/nonrational	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠtraditionally	 ﾠbelonged,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠand	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠbound	 ﾠup	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠan	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubstance,	 ﾠone	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ(§2).	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠgo	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
objections	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠminds	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠones	 ﾠrest	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
misunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠfailing	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠit	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
background	 ﾠ(§3).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠessay	 ﾠwill	 ﾠthus	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rational/nonrational	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠclassical	 ﾠform;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfall	 ﾠfar	 ﾠshort	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠto.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠrather,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
prolegomenon:	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframework	 ﾠinto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠsatisfying	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
rationality	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠfit.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView	 ﾠ
2.1	 ﾠ It	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠthat	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠman	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal.3	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
frequently	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutlook	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproject	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“defining	 ﾠman”	 ﾠbelonged:	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠshould	 ﾠwe	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
appear	 ﾠin	 ﾠone?	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsketch	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Classical	 ﾠView”	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠmatters,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠits	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ By	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView,	 ﾠI	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstrain	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
medieval	 ﾠAristotelianism	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠThomas	 ﾠAquinas	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠexpositor.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠis	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠcontested,	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠideas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠviews	 ﾠof	 ﾠlater	 ﾠthinkers	 ﾠinspired	 ﾠby	 ﾠhim,	 ﾠso	 ﾠit	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠemphasizing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠ
presenting	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠreading	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠand	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐Aristotelian	 ﾠtexts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreading	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠdogmatically,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠ
interpretations	 ﾠor	 ﾠscrutinizing	 ﾠtexts	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetail.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠexcuse	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfinally	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠanyway:	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠout	 ﾠa	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠa	 ﾠplausibility	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠright	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠon	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdebates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplore	 ﾠthree	 ﾠkey	 ﾠideas	 ﾠbelonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView:	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
“rational	 ﾠanimal”	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠessence	 ﾠof	 ﾠhumankind;	 ﾠsecondly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠ
that,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠcharacterizes	 ﾠour	 ﾠform;	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
“rational”	 ﾠdesignates	 ﾠa	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdifferentiates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠ“animal.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠideas	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠas	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠalien	 ﾠand	 ﾠantiquated	 ﾠmetaphysical	 ﾠoutlook,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠ
philosophy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠproved	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunjustifiable	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠscience	 ﾠhas	 ﾠshown	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
superfluous.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsuggest,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠI	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠto	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcarefully	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
neither	 ﾠantiquated	 ﾠnor	 ﾠalien:	 ﾠas	 ﾠcharacterizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠcategorial	 ﾠframework	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠmust	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠand	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠ
thing	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠframework	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconstantly	 ﾠpresuppose	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠabout	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
activities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠsoundness	 ﾠfew	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠpower	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠare	 ﾠequipped	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ
powers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAppreciating	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidea	 ﾠwill,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠallow	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠunhappy	 ﾠdilemmas	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophy	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠarrive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠenables	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠchoice,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmany	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠtake	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
mandatory:	 ﾠeither	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠuniformly	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠor	 ﾠelse	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠliterally	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠcognize	 ﾠand	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappreciating	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidea	 ﾠputs	 ﾠus	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
position	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconceiving	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠas	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
involves	 ﾠa	 ﾠhyper-ﾭ‐intellectualized	 ﾠor	 ﾠhyper-ﾭ‐idealized	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠoperate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
draw	 ﾠout	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠin	 ﾠ§3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠthough,	 ﾠI	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.2	 ﾠ On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠrational	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠhas	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
applications,	 ﾠit	 ﾠappears	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠcreature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Such	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠhas	 ﾠjudged	 ﾠor	 ﾠacted	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠor	 ﾠirrationally,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠchoosing,	 ﾠinferring,	 ﾠor	 ﾠdeliberating)	 ﾠare	 ﾠexercises	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
capacities,	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠa	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexplained	 ﾠby	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
basic	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal.4	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠkind	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠto	 ﾠus	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠkind:	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠbeings,	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠolder	 ﾠidiom,	 ﾠ“man.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“rational	 ﾠanimal”	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
definition	 ﾠof	 ﾠman	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoccurrence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“rational”	 ﾠin	 ﾠ“rational	 ﾠanimal”	 ﾠthus	 ﾠgives	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“focal	 ﾠmeaning”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠterm:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠother	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
being.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhabit	 ﾠof	 ﾠnominalizing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠphrase,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“the	 ﾠwhat-ﾭ‐it-ﾭ‐is-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐be”	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠti	 ﾠēn	 ﾠeinai)	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcomes,	 ﾠby	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠLatin	 ﾠ
translation,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠknown	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠ“essence.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠexplicates	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠfamously	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexplication	 ﾠshould	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
specification	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠunder	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthing	 ﾠfalls,	 ﾠqualified	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ“difference”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
“differences”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdistinguishes	 ﾠits	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus.5	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ It	 ﾠis	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“rational	 ﾠanimal”	 ﾠjust	 ﾠis	 ﾠAristotle’s	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠman6,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠfind	 ﾠno	 ﾠplace	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsays	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠby	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
seems	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠoften	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreason	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠspeech,	 ﾠthought,	 ﾠor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠhe	 ﾠregards	 ﾠas	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures)	 ﾠis	 ﾠunique	 ﾠto	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings;	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“rational	 ﾠanimal”	 ﾠgives	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠan	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠkind’s	 ﾠ
essence,	 ﾠits	 ﾠwhat-ﾭ‐it-ﾭ‐is-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐be,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsome	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠthat	 ﾠuniquely	 ﾠ
characterizes	 ﾠit:	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ“featherless	 ﾠbiped”	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacterizes	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
beings	 ﾠuniquely,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠipso	 ﾠfacto	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠour	 ﾠessence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
indications	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠare	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
animals,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthink	 ﾠ“rational	 ﾠanimal”	 ﾠexhausts	 ﾠour	 ﾠessence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
discusses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtask	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefining	 ﾠ“man,”	 ﾠhe	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠmentions	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠ“two-ﾭ‐footed”)	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠa	 ﾠman	 ﾠ
is.7	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnother	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDe	 ﾠAnima,	 ﾠrational	 ﾠis	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠpar	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
vegetative	 ﾠand	 ﾠanimal;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdifferentiae	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
species	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
species.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠother	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠfall	 ﾠunder	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠman	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdistinguishable	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠother	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠspecies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsince	 ﾠby	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠOn	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠby	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠand	 ﾠdifference,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠTopics	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ5	 ﾠand	 ﾠVI.	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠand	 ﾠParts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAnimals,	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ2-ﾭ‐3.	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
Metaphysics	 ﾠVII.	 ﾠ12.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAll	 ﾠquotations	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtranslations	 ﾠin	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠ1984.	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠCohen	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠ§9.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠSee	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠCategories	 ﾠ5,	 ﾠ3a21	 ﾠand	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠVII.	 ﾠ12,	 ﾠ1037b9-ﾭ‐12.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠ“rational	 ﾠanimal”	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠman.8	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.3	 ﾠ To	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠpartially	 ﾠ
characterizes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠessence	 ﾠof	 ﾠman,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
essence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsomething.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠapproximation,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
essence	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠthing	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠits	 ﾠ“being”	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠto	 ﾠ–	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
concepts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
existence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAristotle’s	 ﾠthought	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecification.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredicate,	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠqualifies	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“substance”	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
essence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠthing’s	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠdesignated	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
fundamental	 ﾠsortal	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthing	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbear	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠexists.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠis:	 ﾠ“human	 ﾠbeing.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠmay	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠlife	 ﾠ
become	 ﾠa	 ﾠfather,	 ﾠor	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠan	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNavy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠnever	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
(for	 ﾠI	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexist	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠI	 ﾠwas	 ﾠone),	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcease	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠceasing	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠ
period.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠalthough,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠborn	 ﾠand	 ﾠraised	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠI	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠand	 ﾠalways	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠAmerican,	 ﾠstill	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvoked	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
explaining	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠexist	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredications.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠI	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
informatively	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠan	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠis	 ﾠby	 ﾠsaying:	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwas	 ﾠborn	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
raised	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠI	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠway	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠby	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠinstantiating	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
fundamental	 ﾠsortal	 ﾠconcept,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠqua	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ
determinations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsortal	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠbe?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠhow	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠwas	 ﾠread	 ﾠby	 ﾠmany	 ﾠmedieval	 ﾠcommentators.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠ
Aquinas	 ﾠsays	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠman	 ﾠas	 ﾠman	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠrational,	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠelse	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠincludes”	 ﾠ
(Aquinas	 ﾠ1949,	 ﾠPart	 ﾠIII,	 ﾠPara.	 ﾠ3;	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠadded),	 ﾠand	 ﾠPorphyry	 ﾠwrites	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“[r]ational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠof	 ﾠman.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMan	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal”	 ﾠ(Porphyry	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠ§2,	 ﾠ4.30-ﾭ‐31).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠfact	 ﾠpossessed	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠproperties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠsortal	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠmore	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ“human	 ﾠbeing”	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“Mammal,”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
instanced	 ﾠby	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ“configured	 ﾠhuman-ﾭ‐being-ﾭ‐ly”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
conceivably	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconfigured	 ﾠin	 ﾠanother	 ﾠway	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsame	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠhave	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcounted	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠhorse.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠmammal	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠitself	 ﾠsuffice	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsustain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconfigured	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat:	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
course	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmammals	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroom,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠthree	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ
belonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠconcrete	 ﾠmammalian	 ﾠspecies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthere	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthree	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
beings	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroom	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrest	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠway	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthere	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ
humans	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeterminate	 ﾠnationalities.9	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ These	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠmight	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdisputed,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠindefensible,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcore	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
concept	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠI	 ﾠam:	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠby	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠexist	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplicability	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠother	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠrests	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
applicability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdescription.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠan	 ﾠirreducible	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbear	 ﾠit:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsay	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠby	 ﾠspecifying	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthem	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Nevertheless,	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠanother	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
principle)	 ﾠexplicate	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠsay	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠmight	 ﾠfall	 ﾠunder	 ﾠplus	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ
count	 ﾠas	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings:	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView	 ﾠholds	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
impossible.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsay	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠdescribe,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthem	 ﾠcount	 ﾠas	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠyou	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠare	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠSee	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠCategories	 ﾠ5	 ﾠand	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠVII.	 ﾠ4.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠdefense	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
individuation,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠWiggins	 ﾠ2001.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappear	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠman	 ﾠthus	 ﾠattach,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
primarily	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠapplicability	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠis	 ﾠalways	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠway	 ﾠmediated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠapplication.10	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠidea,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠit	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠby	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠa	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMichael	 ﾠThompson	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠRepresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Life”	 ﾠ(1994).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThompson	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠall	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
description	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthings	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠindividuals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
description	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠfamiliar,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnature	 ﾠdocumentaries:	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠgrizzly	 ﾠbear	 ﾠdigs	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
den	 ﾠunder	 ﾠrocks	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhollow	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠtree,	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcave	 ﾠor	 ﾠcrevice.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠinto	 ﾠits	 ﾠden	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠand	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠand	 ﾠstays	 ﾠthere	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠspring.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprotective	 ﾠ
layer	 ﾠof	 ﾠfat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallows	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠstay	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠden	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠweather	 ﾠis	 ﾠcold.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreally	 ﾠ
hibernate	 ﾠand	 ﾠcan	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwoken	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwinter…”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠdescribe,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgrizzly	 ﾠbear	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ(indeed,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠone	 ﾠmay	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠden,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠmay	 ﾠfail	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠgo	 ﾠinto	 ﾠit	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠtime)	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠdone	 ﾠby	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠgrizzly	 ﾠbear,”	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠgrizzly	 ﾠbears	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠgeneral”	 ﾠis	 ﾠheard	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠregister.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠholds	 ﾠof	 ﾠmost	 ﾠgrizzly	 ﾠbears:	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠencroachment	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠhabitat,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠactual	 ﾠgrizzlies	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuild	 ﾠup	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlayer	 ﾠof	 ﾠfat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallows	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠsurvive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwinter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEven	 ﾠso,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠ
description	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠgrizzly	 ﾠbear”	 ﾠlives	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠit	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠinto	 ﾠhibernation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠprotective	 ﾠ
layer	 ﾠof	 ﾠfat.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠstory	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠare	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
grizzlies:	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠconstituting	 ﾠa	 ﾠteleologically-ﾭ‐structured	 ﾠstory	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠget	 ﾠby	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRecognizing	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠtry	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ“normally”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“properly”	 ﾠgo	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgrizzly	 ﾠbears.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut,	 ﾠas	 ﾠThompson	 ﾠpersuasively	 ﾠ
argues,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠ“properly”	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ“if	 ﾠthings	 ﾠgo	 ﾠright	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdoctrines,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠitself”	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠ
“per	 ﾠse”)	 ﾠin	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠVII.	 ﾠ4:	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠessence	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠthing	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠyou	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠmusical,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠyou	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠyour	 ﾠvery	 ﾠnature	 ﾠmusical.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠare	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
your	 ﾠvery	 ﾠnature	 ﾠis	 ﾠyour	 ﾠessence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(1029b13-ﾭ‐1029b15)	 ﾠ
Compare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠCategories	 ﾠ3-ﾭ‐5	 ﾠand	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ9.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
being	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrizzly	 ﾠbear”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠis	 ﾠmet	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠtruth-ﾭ‐conditions	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Thompson	 ﾠconcludes	 ﾠ–	 ﾠafter	 ﾠshowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfutility	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠother	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠto	 ﾠcash	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth-ﾭ‐conditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtruths	 ﾠabout	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtruths	 ﾠare	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠtruths	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠgrizzly	 ﾠbear”	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠother	 ﾠconcrete	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthing).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠtruths	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
natural	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠlinguists	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ“generics,”	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
form:	 ﾠ“Ss	 ﾠare/have/do	 ﾠF”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠS	 ﾠis/has/does	 ﾠF.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnotoriously	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
give	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth-ﾭ‐conditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth-ﾭ‐
conditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠabout	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠkind	 ﾠS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠThompson	 ﾠargues	 ﾠconvincingly	 ﾠ
that,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠgenerics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠhis	 ﾠargument	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInstead	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ
observe	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠsome	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdiscovered	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproved	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠextensionally	 ﾠcorrect,	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimplausible	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth-ﾭ‐conditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
sentences	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠconnecting	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtruths	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠkinds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠgrasp	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrasp	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmediately	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
application	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠthought	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappear	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠkind:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
features	 ﾠthat	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠattributes	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠkind	 ﾠitself.11	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Thompson’s	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbrings	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforce	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
predicates	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠkind	 ﾠis	 ﾠmediated	 ﾠby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
For,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠargues,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠorganism	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠwing,	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠtooth,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠchemical	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠdigestion,	 ﾠor	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠis	 ﾠalive,	 ﾠI	 ﾠimplicitly	 ﾠcommit	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠto	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠessence	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Moravcsik	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠanother	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠindebted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠor	 ﾠoccurrences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlife	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
creature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexcrescence	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwing	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeformity	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
already	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠorganism’s	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be:	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthis	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠshape	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrealization	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠshaped	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
function	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlife	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcreature,	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcame	 ﾠto	 ﾠexist	 ﾠhere	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
extent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠliving	 ﾠorganisms	 ﾠthus	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠthose	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠlike	 ﾠis	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ(more	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠperfect)	 ﾠrealization	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
potentialities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhappenings	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠare	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
(more	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠsuccessful)	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpotentialities	 ﾠand	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
attributable	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠ
thing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠmere	 ﾠsuperficial	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
living	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠThompson	 ﾠobserves	 ﾠin	 ﾠanother	 ﾠpaper:	 ﾠ
Even	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠapparently	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganism	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠ
here	 ﾠand	 ﾠends	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠor	 ﾠweighs	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmuch,	 ﾠmust	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠa	 ﾠcovert	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠits	 ﾠlife	 ﾠform.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠform,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠdim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconception	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠyou	 ﾠcould	 ﾠintelligibly	 ﾠsuppose,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe[se]	 ﾠtentacles	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
parasites	 ﾠor	 ﾠcancerous	 ﾠexcrescences	 ﾠor	 ﾠundetached	 ﾠbits	 ﾠof	 ﾠwaste.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Thompson	 ﾠ
2004,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ52)	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“life	 ﾠforms”	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠteleologically-ﾭ‐organized	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
life	 ﾠcycle	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠgrizzly	 ﾠbear,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhorseshoe	 ﾠcrab,	 ﾠetc.).12	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
Thompson	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠpredications	 ﾠthat	 ﾠascribe	 ﾠvital	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠorganisms	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
mediated	 ﾠby	 ﾠpredications	 ﾠholding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠkind	 ﾠper	 ﾠse,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠsuggest.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.4	 ﾠ It	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠemphasizing	 ﾠhow	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠThis	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠjudger’s	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
correct.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠvital	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠorganism,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcommit	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshape	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠtakes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
essential	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠis	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtopic.13	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠessential	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠ
explicates	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠin	 ﾠmodal	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview,	 ﾠx	 ﾠis	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠF	 ﾠjust	 ﾠin	 ﾠcase	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠx	 ﾠexists,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠF,	 ﾠi.e.:	 ﾠ
(N)	 ﾠ ☐(∃y(y=x)	 ﾠ→	 ﾠFx)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠessence	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠabove	 ﾠgives	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠits	 ﾠessence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
involves	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠquestions:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(1)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ What	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠkind	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠbelongs?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(2)	 ﾠ What	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Question	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠis	 ﾠanswered	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠterm	 ﾠS	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdesignates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠkind	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠbelongs,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“human	 ﾠbeing”	 ﾠdesignates	 ﾠour	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠkind;	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠview,	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠSs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠexist	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠSs.14	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Question	 ﾠ(2),	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠanswered	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexplicates	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠS,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtraits	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdefinition,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠS,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossessed	 ﾠby	 ﾠevery	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠwill	 ﾠthus	 ﾠyield	 ﾠ
propositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠimportantly	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtypes:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (E1)	 ﾠ The	 ﾠessence	 ﾠof	 ﾠx	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠS.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (E2)	 ﾠ Ss	 ﾠare	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠF.	 ﾠ
Only	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠform	 ﾠ(E1)	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠindividuals;	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠform	 ﾠ(E2)	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐standing	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠkind	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthough	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
course	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠcharacterizing	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠgrateful	 ﾠto	 ﾠDorit	 ﾠBar-ﾭ‐On	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠwell	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠby	 ﾠsaying,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ(N)	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠworld	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexist.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠworlds	 ﾠ
framework	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeing-ﾭ‐a-ﾭ‐such-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐such	 ﾠthat	 ﾠholds	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Indeed,	 ﾠif	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠis	 ﾠour	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠactual	 ﾠexistents	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠis	 ﾠwell	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
cannot	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠthese	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠhowever.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠessential	 ﾠ
property	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(N),	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdecisively	 ﾠ
differentiate	 ﾠit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
complex	 ﾠways	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconsidering.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ It	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠclear	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠrender	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠform	 ﾠ(E2)	 ﾠin	 ﾠmodal	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (N2)	 ﾠ ☐(x)(Sx	 ﾠ→	 ﾠFx)	 ﾠ
That	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠworlds,	 ﾠif	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠS,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠF.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Other	 ﾠreadings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠby	 ﾠplacing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠpositions.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠ
difficulty	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ(N2)	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠplainly	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠAristotelians	 ﾠmean	 ﾠby	 ﾠsaying,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠare	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐footed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfeet.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHaving	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfeet	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
belong	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠI,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠam	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
being,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠlose	 ﾠa	 ﾠfoot	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠceasing	 ﾠto	 ﾠexist	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠceasing	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfeet	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimply	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodal	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠform	 ﾠ(N2).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠany	 ﾠvariant	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠcan	 ﾠescape	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjection,	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠretains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠambition	 ﾠof	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠform	 ﾠ(E2)	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals.15	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠfact	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdescriptions	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠapply	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠkind	 ﾠper	 ﾠse	 ﾠand	 ﾠdescriptions	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠapply	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠSimilar	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠnonstandard	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠessence	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠKit	 ﾠFine	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠFine	 ﾠ
1994,	 ﾠ1995a,	 ﾠ1995b).	 ﾠ	 ﾠFine	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠabout	 ﾠessence	 ﾠto	 ﾠmodal	 ﾠpropositions:	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
treats	 ﾠ“Essentially”	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprimitive	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠon	 ﾠpropositions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠmodality	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
essence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFine,	 ﾠ“[a]	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠobject	 ﾠis	 ﾠessential	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠit	 ﾠis”	 ﾠ(1995a,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ53),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠleads	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠan	 ﾠaxiom	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠ
characterizes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠessence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠsimpliciter	 ﾠ(his	 ﾠaxiom	 ﾠ☐F	 ﾠA	 ﾠ→	 ﾠA:	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
Fine	 ﾠ1995b,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ247	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠaxiom	 ﾠis	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFine’s	 ﾠ
“☐F”	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠto	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠbut	 ﾠan	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠon	 ﾠpropositions,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠFine	 ﾠintroduces	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
stipulating	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠ“☐F	 ﾠA”	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠA	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
objects	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠF”).	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠin	 ﾠFine’s	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠhands	 ﾠwill	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠschematized	 ﾠas	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
☐human	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfeet.	 ﾠ
And	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠimply	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfeet.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠessence	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠfeet,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠof	 ﾠme	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠit	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠessence	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfeet;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
yet	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrule	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactually	 ﾠfailing	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfeet,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠdefect	 ﾠof	 ﾠbirth	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
misadventure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
treatments	 ﾠof	 ﾠessence	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdraw.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView,	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
essential	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠare	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠinference	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠtruths	 ﾠto	 ﾠfreestanding	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠare	 ﾠlike.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
truths	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠand	 ﾠtruths	 ﾠabout	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠare	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠunconnected:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruths	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠgo	 ﾠfor	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠif	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠinterferes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterference	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠexceptions	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdisprove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.5	 ﾠ Having	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠabout	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthings	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠessences	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
return	 ﾠto	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“rational	 ﾠanimal”	 ﾠseems	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠpartial	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠessence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠby	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠand	 ﾠdifferentia,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠit	 ﾠspecifies	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
generic	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠthen	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠit	 ﾠcharacterize?	 ﾠ	 ﾠDoes	 ﾠit,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ
“mammalian,”	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠpick	 ﾠout	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠtraits	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠexhibit?	 ﾠ	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠ
seems	 ﾠto	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational/nonrational	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠas	 ﾠmarking	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠthat.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠindication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠtreats	 ﾠrational	 ﾠas	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
par	 ﾠwith	 ﾠvegetative	 ﾠand	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠdesignating	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠsoul.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠsoul?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrecall	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠfamously	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthings	 ﾠin	 ﾠhylomorphic	 ﾠ
terms,	 ﾠas	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠsort	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠform.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠsoul,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠAristotle,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthing:	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstructuring	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
sort	 ﾠconstitutes	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthing.16	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“ensouled”	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠpartake	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠ
characteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat?	 ﾠ	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠDe	 ﾠAnima	 ﾠII.	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ(412a16-ﾭ‐21).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ
cannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanswered	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠthree	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
living	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠways	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠunrelated,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdefinable	 ﾠby	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
single	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠschema.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠway	 ﾠsuccessive	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠorder	 ﾠof	 ﾠappearance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠdefined.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠhow	 ﾠanimality	 ﾠtransforms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
mode	 ﾠof	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnutritive	 ﾠsoul,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappears	 ﾠ
primitively	 ﾠin	 ﾠplants;	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
rationality	 ﾠtransforms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠsoul.17	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠimplies,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠrational	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
virtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthing	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠnegotiating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
imperatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠlife	 ﾠby	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire-ﾭ‐governed	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimplies,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠis	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠ
transformed	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“Rational”	 ﾠcounts	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferentiating	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“animal”,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠname	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrait	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠexhibit,	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdiffers	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠ
Aristotle	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotions	 ﾠof	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠand	 ﾠdifferentia	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ
By	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠI	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠthing	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠpredicated	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
differentiated	 ﾠin	 ﾠno	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠaccidental	 ﾠway…	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠmust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠattach	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠmust	 ﾠboth	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠvery	 ﾠanimality	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach…	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠI	 ﾠgive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠname	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
‘difference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus’	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠotherness	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠitself	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(Metaphysics	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ8,	 ﾠ1057b38-ﾭ‐1058a7)	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtransform	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠnot	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠappear	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive:	 ﾠ“rationality”	 ﾠwould	 ﾠjust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠspecies,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthings	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠsense	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
animal	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis,	 ﾠpresumably,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠAristotle’s	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠ
“mammality”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhis	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“rationality”:	 ﾠhe	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠrational	 ﾠtransforms	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠconstitutes	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠSee	 ﾠDe	 ﾠAnima	 ﾠII.	 ﾠ2-ﾭ‐3,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“life	 ﾠis	 ﾠspoken	 ﾠof	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠways”	 ﾠ(413a22)	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“we	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠinquire	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠplant,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠman,	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠa	 ﾠbeast”	 ﾠ(414b31).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠ“for	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive,”18	 ﾠthis	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠof	 ﾠessence,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“what-ﾭ‐it-ﾭ‐is-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐be.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠaiming	 ﾠto	 ﾠarrive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLet	 ﾠme	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠhow	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠasking	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational-ﾭ‐nonrational	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsense	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠdistinction,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠminds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠarrived	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠconclusions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView,	 ﾠ“rational”	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdifferentiate	 ﾠus	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠnames	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
trait	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhappens	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠto	 ﾠhumans.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠbelongs,	 ﾠrather,	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
essence,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠour	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠas	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠ
to.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpredicable	 ﾠof	 ﾠus	 ﾠas	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠpredicable	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
substantial	 ﾠkind	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠ(namely:	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing).	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcharacterizes	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠkind	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconcrete	 ﾠdescriptive	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ“mammalian”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“two-ﾭ‐
footed”	 ﾠdo:	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠessence,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠessence	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠput	 ﾠit	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway:	 ﾠ“rational”	 ﾠspecifies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠframe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠundergirds	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠconcrete	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexhibit	 ﾠbut	 ﾠour	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠcharacteristics.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This,	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠof	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“rational”	 ﾠcharacterizes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
being.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠkind	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠessential	 ﾠtraits	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
predicated;	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠper	 ﾠse,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠonly	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠto	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠforms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdifferentiates	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠanother	 ﾠthus	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠname	 ﾠa	 ﾠconcrete	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
characteristics)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthings	 ﾠpossess;	 ﾠit	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredication	 ﾠof	 ﾠvital	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠDe	 ﾠAnima	 ﾠII.	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠ415b13.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ
2.6	 ﾠ I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠstated	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠvery	 ﾠabstractly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
significance	 ﾠclearer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Let	 ﾠus	 ﾠstart	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimpler	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠplant	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠof	 ﾠform,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsider	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠplant	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMany	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
tempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplants	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠact	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
right:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠact	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
episodes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlives	 ﾠof	 ﾠplants	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠas	 ﾠagents	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠas	 ﾠmere	 ﾠpatients.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠa	 ﾠtree	 ﾠis	 ﾠchopped	 ﾠdown,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpatient;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠgrows	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbranch,	 ﾠor	 ﾠflowers	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠspring,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠagent:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠare	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtree	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsense	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
done	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNow,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠagency	 ﾠand	 ﾠpatiency	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠevent	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠlies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbranch	 ﾠ
counts	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtree	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠbecause,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠenvironing	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhappening,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsought	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtree	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠ
discussed	 ﾠearlier).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtree’s	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbranch	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠlogico-ﾭ‐grammatical	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠact,	 ﾠone	 ﾠexpressible	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive-ﾭ‐voice	 ﾠprogressive	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtree	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠits	 ﾠsubject.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠis	 ﾠeven	 ﾠgoal-ﾭ‐directed	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠenough	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠtrees	 ﾠgrow	 ﾠbranches	 ﾠ
precisely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠbranches	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠcanopy	 ﾠof	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
absorb	 ﾠsunlight.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal-ﾭ‐directed	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
clearly	 ﾠspeaking	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠand	 ﾠgoal-ﾭ‐directedness	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠaltogether	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠregister.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠplant;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“doing”	 ﾠcan	 ﾠapply	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
wholly	 ﾠnew	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal.19	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠintuitively	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠone	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
intuition	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdescriptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhere	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠcan	 ﾠnever	 ﾠenter	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“acts”	 ﾠof	 ﾠplants	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠtriggerings,	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
19	 ﾠThus	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠsays	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplants	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ“movement	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠand	 ﾠdecay”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ“movement	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠof	 ﾠplace,”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠmovement:	 ﾠsee	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠDe	 ﾠAnima	 ﾠII.	 ﾠ4	 ﾠand	 ﾠIII.	 ﾠ9.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
hindrances.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠroot	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠtree	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠround	 ﾠa	 ﾠstone,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠ
sentimental	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroot	 ﾠis	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠround	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
stone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstone	 ﾠhere	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtree’s	 ﾠact	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠroot-ﾭ‐growing,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠgoal-ﾭ‐directedly	 ﾠtending.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtree’s	 ﾠroots	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ
grow,	 ﾠas	 ﾠfar	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠpattern:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstone	 ﾠenters	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠhindrance	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠgrowth,	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinterferes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠqualifies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠresultant	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtree’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠdoing,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠdone	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠact	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhere	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow:	 ﾠ
descriptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠcan	 ﾠenter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIts	 ﾠ
capacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠtransform	 ﾠits	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠalive	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpossible:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠopen	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
circumstances	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠtriggering,	 ﾠhindrance,	 ﾠor	 ﾠfacilitation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠenters	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠobject,	 ﾠor	 ﾠdo	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobstacle.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠthing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠfill	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“A”-ﾭ‐slot	 ﾠin	 ﾠ“S	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠA”	 ﾠwill	 ﾠthus	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“A”	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
fundamentally	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkind	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠa	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadverts	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠ(growing	 ﾠa	 ﾠbranch,	 ﾠ
flowering,	 ﾠetc.),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠtype	 ﾠthat	 ﾠembraces	 ﾠparticularity	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠitself:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠ(hunting	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠfleeing	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠetc.)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠto	 ﾠborrow	 ﾠa	 ﾠFregean	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠ–	 ﾠan	 ﾠunsaturated	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwaits	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠ(or,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠsophisticated	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠmemory,	 ﾠimagination,	 ﾠetc.)	 ﾠto	 ﾠfill	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
plants	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠno	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠgaps.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠanother	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠact	 ﾠas	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplants	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠoak	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠbranch,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreally	 ﾠlook	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular:	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
just	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠmature	 ﾠoaks	 ﾠdo	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠenough	 ﾠ
sunlight,	 ﾠenough	 ﾠwater,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshould	 ﾠoccur,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠabout	 ﾠit	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠdisposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠhere	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠact	 ﾠis	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
just	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠfact	 ﾠabout	 ﾠits	 ﾠkind:	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhere	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠenters	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠtrigger,	 ﾠhelp,	 ﾠor	 ﾠhindrance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing,	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
contrast,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠone,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠpursues	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
laws	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular.20	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠplant	 ﾠand	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
detail	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ
“mammalian”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“land-ﾭ‐dwelling,”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠ“animal”	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠname	 ﾠa	 ﾠconcrete	 ﾠ
characteristic	 ﾠexhibited	 ﾠby	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
distinctive	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredication	 ﾠof	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠ
that,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠboth	 ﾠplants	 ﾠand	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
agents	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhappens	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠperfectly	 ﾠcorrectly	 ﾠand	 ﾠliterally	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
pursue	 ﾠgoals,	 ﾠetc.,	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpredications	 ﾠapply	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplants	 ﾠcannot;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
whole	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“doing”	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠsignificance,	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠcharacter,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠturn	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠplants	 ﾠto	 ﾠanimals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠabout	 ﾠpredications	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠcategories:	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠadmits,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠa	 ﾠplant,	 ﾠof,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠacted	 ﾠon,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠqualified	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠway,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠplace	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠone	 ﾠthing.21	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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20	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdepth	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠevident,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
failure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠagency	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠpossible.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠcat	 ﾠis	 ﾠchasing	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠmouse	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcatch	 ﾠit,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
manages	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠhappens	 ﾠto	 ﾠpounce	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠmouse,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠsense	 ﾠgot	 ﾠwas	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ(namely,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmouse),	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ(namely,	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠmouse,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠchasing).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠtree’s	 ﾠroots	 ﾠare	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠup	 ﾠwater,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠ
contrive	 ﾠto	 ﾠreplace	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwater	 ﾠmolecules	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠceteris	 ﾠparibus	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠup	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠwater	 ﾠ
molecules,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtree	 ﾠhave	 ﾠchanged,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠno	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠbelonging	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtree	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPlants,	 ﾠas	 ﾠplants,	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠengage	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠhere	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(This	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠeven	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVenus	 ﾠFlytrap,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠreacts	 ﾠto	 ﾠstimuli	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbears	 ﾠan	 ﾠuncanny	 ﾠresemblance	 ﾠto	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠpercipience.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠFlytrap	 ﾠis	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠto	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠfly’s	 ﾠtouching	 ﾠits	 ﾠtrigger-ﾭ‐hairs,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠall	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠplants	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
hairs	 ﾠare	 ﾠtouched:	 ﾠit	 ﾠsnaps	 ﾠshut.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsnapping	 ﾠis	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠfly,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠitself	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
completely	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaimed	 ﾠat,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠoccasioned	 ﾠby,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfly	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
21	 ﾠThis	 ﾠacross-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐board	 ﾠtransformation	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠ
esp.	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠVII.	 ﾠ1):	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠis	 ﾠtransformed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredications	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠundergoes	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorrelative	 ﾠtransformation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
generically	 ﾠalike	 ﾠbut	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠliving	 ﾠbut	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠanimal),	 ﾠthis	 ﾠintroduces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
possibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredications	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠgenerically	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠbut	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠevery	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠ
differently	 ﾠto	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠplants:	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠ
between,	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠtalking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠweight	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠplant	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠweight	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠor	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
talking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolor	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠplant’s	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolor	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal’s	 ﾠfur.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredications	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠas	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠplants,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠin	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredications	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctively	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠcharacter,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“animal”	 ﾠmarks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠfuller	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠalso	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠpredications	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcore	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal;	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠ
register	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving,	 ﾠdoing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠexists	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠother	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠit	 ﾠbears	 ﾠ
(weight,	 ﾠcolor,	 ﾠetc.).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidea	 ﾠwould	 ﾠtake	 ﾠus	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠfar	 ﾠafield;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanimal/nonanimal	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠdifferentiates	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife:	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠdifferentiates	 ﾠliving	 ﾠkinds,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
possess,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠcharacteristics,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpredications	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
being,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtake	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Likewise,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational/nonrational	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
difference.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠis	 ﾠcapable,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠhaving,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
nonrational	 ﾠcreature,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠascriptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠhaving,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
distinctive	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsider	 ﾠaction	 ﾠonce	 ﾠagain	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠillustration.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
obvious	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠnotions	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠan	 ﾠagent,	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
pursuing	 ﾠa	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
obvious	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠand	 ﾠgoal-ﾭ‐directedness	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠform	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Nevertheless,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“doing	 ﾠsomething”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠto	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠact	 ﾠintentionally.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
widely	 ﾠconceded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplicability	 ﾠof	 ﾠascriptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
(e.g.,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠof	 ﾠvital	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠbut	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠaction).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ
distinctive	 ﾠsense	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠknowingly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
exercising	 ﾠits	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠends	 ﾠare	 ﾠworth	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠsense	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoings	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
ascription	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠknows	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠ
prerogative	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠAquinas	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠintend	 ﾠan	 ﾠend	 ﾠand	 ﾠact	 ﾠvoluntarily	 ﾠin	 ﾠpursuit	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠ“an	 ﾠimperfect	 ﾠsense,”	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠintention	 ﾠor	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠaction	 ﾠin	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠperfect	 ﾠsense,”	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠordain	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠend	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠend	 ﾠ“under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠend”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Rather,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠapprehend	 ﾠan	 ﾠobject	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠact	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠinstinct	 ﾠor	 ﾠacquired	 ﾠhabit	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠpursuit	 ﾠof	 ﾠit.22	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Some	 ﾠwill	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonhuman	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠare	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠno	 ﾠposition	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
classification	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠout	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
seems	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠintelligible,	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠone	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠis	 ﾠintelligible,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠ“doing”	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠrelatedly,	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠ
responsibility,	 ﾠpursuit	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠend,	 ﾠetc.)	 ﾠadmits	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠregisters,	 ﾠone	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠother	 ﾠrational.23	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠcorresponds	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“A”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdoing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
manner	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠ“is	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠA”	 ﾠattaches	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
develop	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠwould	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
rationality,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠmakes,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠgive	 ﾠsense	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
22	 ﾠSee	 ﾠSumma	 ﾠTheologica,	 ﾠIaIIae,	 ﾠQ.	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ2	 ﾠand	 ﾠQ.	 ﾠ12,	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ
23	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠI	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠG.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠAnscombe’s	 ﾠcryptic	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“intentional”	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠname	 ﾠ
“an	 ﾠextra	 ﾠfeature”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaccompanies	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠactions	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠ“has	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
events”	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠAnscombe	 ﾠ1957,	 ﾠ§§19,	 ﾠ47).	 ﾠ	 ﾠHer	 ﾠaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“intentional	 ﾠaction”	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠpick	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠclass	 ﾠof	 ﾠevents	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠevent-ﾭ‐predication,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
creatures	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“why?”-ﾭ‐explanation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠidentifies,	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
application	 ﾠpresupposes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠitself	 ﾠknows	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠacts	 ﾠ
precisely	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠknowledge.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠquotation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠHerder	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhead	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrux	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
conception:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠability	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthings	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNor	 ﾠ
again	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“reason”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠname	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpower	 ﾠ–	 ﾠlike	 ﾠsight	 ﾠor	 ﾠhearing	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠwalk	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠlegs	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠenables	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠsome	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifferentiated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
Herder	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ“reason”	 ﾠnames	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠpowers,”	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
organization	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdetermines	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠorientation	 ﾠand	 ﾠunfolding	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
powers.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmeans,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠtransforms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠacts	 ﾠare	 ﾠascribable	 ﾠto	 ﾠus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠact-ﾭ‐predication,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠessence,	 ﾠit	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠform	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexist,	 ﾠas	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredication,	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.24	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠApplications	 ﾠ
3.1	 ﾠ This	 ﾠreconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠworthwhile	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠface	 ﾠus	 ﾠhere	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLet	 ﾠme	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠby	 ﾠmentioning	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
nonrational	 ﾠminds	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforegoing	 ﾠreflections	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreason	 ﾠbrings	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadmits	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredication,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠdefenders.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
defended,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠby	 ﾠDonald	 ﾠDavidson,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfamously	 ﾠclaimed,	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠclass	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredicates,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠascribe	 ﾠ
so-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠ“propositional	 ﾠattitudes”;	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
governed	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“constitutive	 ﾠideal	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality”	 ﾠ(Davidson	 ﾠ1980,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ223).	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
24	 ﾠA	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠHerder	 ﾠsuggests,	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠsensing,	 ﾠcognizing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠ
nature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredication	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠanimality,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifferentiated	 ﾠby	 ﾠrationality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 24	 ﾠ
rationality	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
bearing	 ﾠamounts,	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit,	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaiming	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
doing	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredications	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
representation	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠform,	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠthat	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠus	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
rationality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNow,	 ﾠDavidson’s	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠinfluential,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
recurrent	 ﾠobjections.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠas	 ﾠfalling	 ﾠunder	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠheads:	 ﾠ(i)	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
acting	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe’re	 ﾠcapable,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(ii)	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmere	 ﾠideal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
rationality	 ﾠcan	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠactually	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠabout	 ﾠus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠabout	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠobjections,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforegoing	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠbears	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.2	 ﾠ One	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠviews	 ﾠlike	 ﾠDavidson’s	 ﾠbegins	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠ
except	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠdefending	 ﾠa	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonhuman	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthings	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
environment,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpast	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcan	 ﾠact	 ﾠintelligently	 ﾠin	 ﾠpursuit	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAll	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdescriptions	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠperfectly	 ﾠliterally	 ﾠto	 ﾠnonhuman	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthey	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠin	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠexplanations	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthey	 ﾠbehave.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthis	 ﾠimpression	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠreinforced	 ﾠby	 ﾠrigorous	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthus	 ﾠbe	 ﾠperverse	 ﾠ–	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
objection	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnonhuman	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠon;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
exactly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠperversity	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠonly	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
propositional	 ﾠattitudes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliteral	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠascriptions	 ﾠ
presupposes	 ﾠrationality,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠquite	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠ
kingdom;	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠif	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠto	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
presupposed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtalk.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠany	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectors	 ﾠ
conclude,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“lower”	 ﾠ
animals,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsophistication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrepresentational	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠcan	 ﾠentertain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠperform	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠaltogether	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresentational	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠrests	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforegoing	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠhas	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresources	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠor	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠboth	 ﾠto	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsusceptible	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle,	 ﾠ
undifferentiating	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠboth	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠapplication.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Univocality	 ﾠAssumption,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
univocal	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠto	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠmanifests	 ﾠ
itself	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠheard	 ﾠinsistence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠwarrant,	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmake	 ﾠany	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmeet,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠ
animals	 ﾠplainly	 ﾠhold	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠon.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinference	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠvalid	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnivocality	 ﾠAssumption,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdifferentiate	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠ
animals	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠas	 ﾠholding	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
warranted,	 ﾠetc.,	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠto	 ﾠhumans	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmeet.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Must	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnivocality	 ﾠAssumption?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠhis	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ“Perceptual	 ﾠEntitlement,”	 ﾠ
Tyler	 ﾠBurge	 ﾠwrites:	 ﾠ
Children	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠnonhuman	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠlack	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠlike	 ﾠreliable,	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠcondition,	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠindividuation,	 ﾠdefeating	 ﾠcondition,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠYet	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠsound	 ﾠ
basis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdenying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠepistemology	 ﾠcan	 ﾠevaluate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
norms	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠformation,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspectival	 ﾠlimitations	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
environmental	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliever.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠsound	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdenying	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠepistemology	 ﾠcan	 ﾠevaluate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠwarrant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(Burge	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ528)	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠreading	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠBurge	 ﾠsays	 ﾠhere	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠundeniable:	 ﾠnonhuman	 ﾠ
animals	 ﾠpatently	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresentations	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠ
representations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠevery	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ“beliefs,”	 ﾠrepresentations	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠraise	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠof	 ﾠwarrant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠBurge	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
attacking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠassociates	 ﾠwith	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠSellars,	 ﾠDavidson,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 26	 ﾠ
McDowell	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
warrant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“lies	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ‘the	 ﾠspace	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasons’.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwrites	 ﾠas	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠconstituted	 ﾠa	 ﾠrefutation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis:	 ﾠif	 ﾠnonhuman	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠwarranted	 ﾠin	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠBurge	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠwarranted	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
depend	 ﾠon	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnonhuman	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpossess.25	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinference	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠa	 ﾠblinkered	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoptions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhatever	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
means	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreature’s	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ“lie	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspace	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasons,”	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
sensible	 ﾠdefender	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠentail	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnonhuman	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠor	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwarranted	 ﾠin	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠhold,	 ﾠinstead,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
concepts	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠhere	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
connection	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadvent	 ﾠof	 ﾠreason	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠand	 ﾠnew	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠof	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠapply	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠ
animals	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠambiguous	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“belief”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“warrant”	 ﾠin	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠkinds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrather	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
claim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠand	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
warrant,	 ﾠare	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠgenus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView	 ﾠ
holds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational-ﾭ‐nonrational	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠallows	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
generic	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠand	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠpredicates	 ﾠapply.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠ
just	 ﾠas	 ﾠboth	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠact,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
applied	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠregister	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠso	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠboth	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
nonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠis	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠregister	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠword	 ﾠ“belief”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinctively	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcase	 ﾠor	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot:	 ﾠeither	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠamount	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbit	 ﾠof	 ﾠterminological	 ﾠlegislation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeither	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠ
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25	 ﾠBurge’s	 ﾠviews	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠdeserve	 ﾠa	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠfuller	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠthan	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgive	 ﾠthem	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠquote	 ﾠhim	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠas	 ﾠexemplifying	 ﾠa	 ﾠwidespread	 ﾠreadiness	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunivocality	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
concepts	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational-ﾭ‐nonrational	 ﾠboundary.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠfuller	 ﾠpresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠBurge’s	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠBurge	 ﾠ
2010.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠBurge’s	 ﾠviews	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠin	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 27	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlose	 ﾠsight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠlikeness	 ﾠand	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠthat	 ﾠobtains	 ﾠ
here.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ My	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠthese	 ﾠviews	 ﾠabout	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠpossibility.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠan	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
defensible	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠat	 ﾠhand.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUnivocality	 ﾠAssumption	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠrules	 ﾠout	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
position	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠinference,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwarrant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
claim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠstringent	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠin	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠto	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠdeserves	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
hearing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠwere	 ﾠvindicated,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠBurge	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
basis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdenying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠepistemology	 ﾠcan	 ﾠevaluate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠof	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
nonhuman	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠproper	 ﾠto	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbeings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ There	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠtendency,	 ﾠin	 ﾠstudying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
nonhuman	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠeither	 ﾠvindicate	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
disprove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsome	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
study	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠother	 ﾠprimates	 ﾠcan	 ﾠuse	 ﾠtools,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmirror,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠuse	 ﾠa	 ﾠsymbolic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠlanguage,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
fascinating,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠtest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠother	 ﾠprimates	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthey	 ﾠrest	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistorted	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfact	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠamount	 ﾠto.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠView	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrational-ﾭ‐nonrational	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠmanifest	 ﾠitself	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
creatures	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠsome	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠthing	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠcannot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
expect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠis	 ﾠpervasively,	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠcreatures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanalogies	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠtool	 ﾠuse	 ﾠand	 ﾠthings	 ﾠdone	 ﾠby	 ﾠother	 ﾠprimates,	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcommunicative	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠprimates,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
granted	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠsides	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠfall	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠgenus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠ
though,	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠspeaking	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠregister	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ“use	 ﾠ
tools,”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“communicate,”	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhatever.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠfixate	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠsome	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpattern	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠisolation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcomparing	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠmirror-ﾭ‐
behavior	 ﾠwith	 ﾠchimpanzee	 ﾠmirror-ﾭ‐behavior,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠreadiness	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠa	 ﾠhammer	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
drive	 ﾠa	 ﾠnail	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchimpanzee	 ﾠreadiness	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠa	 ﾠstick	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠants	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠhole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ground	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlife-ﾭ‐form	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
question,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacterizes	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠtruths.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDo	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpresuppose	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠthought	 ﾠor	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthey	 ﾠnot?	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠdetermination	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
involve	 ﾠa	 ﾠholistic	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠdetermination	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠan	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠseems	 ﾠunclear	 ﾠor	 ﾠinsignificant,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠplace.26	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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3.3	 ﾠ A	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠviews	 ﾠthat	 ﾠposit	 ﾠan	 ﾠessential	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠtie	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
framework	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠidealized	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠplausible.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDavidson	 ﾠsays	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
significance	 ﾠof	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠascriptions	 ﾠby	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠideal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
rationality,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhold,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠapply	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“principle	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcharity”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠthought	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
possible.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠjustifies	 ﾠus	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupposing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactual	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwill	 ﾠlive	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠideal?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Aren’t	 ﾠtendencies	 ﾠto	 ﾠinconsistency,	 ﾠto	 ﾠweakness	 ﾠof	 ﾠwill,	 ﾠto	 ﾠrash	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠon,	 ﾠas	 ﾠreal	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
part	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠas	 ﾠany	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠthings	 ﾠright?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠalready	 ﾠ
obvious	 ﾠto	 ﾠuntutored	 ﾠobservation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectors	 ﾠnote,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠamply	 ﾠconfirmed	 ﾠby	 ﾠrigorous	 ﾠ
studies	 ﾠof	 ﾠbiases	 ﾠin	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠStephen	 ﾠStich	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠessay	 ﾠ“Could	 ﾠ
Man	 ﾠBe	 ﾠan	 ﾠIrrational	 ﾠAnimal?”:	 ﾠ
Aristotle	 ﾠthought	 ﾠman	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠhis	 ﾠtime	 ﾠto	 ﾠours,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠsteady	 ﾠstream	 ﾠof	 ﾠwriters	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdissented	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
26	 ﾠFor	 ﾠsuggestive	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinguishing	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
consistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠTomasello	 ﾠ2001.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTomasello	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpert	 ﾠat	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠput	 ﾠit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠthought	 ﾠtransforms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
capable	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠintelligent	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ
sanguine	 ﾠassessment…	 ﾠ	 ﾠDuring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠdecade	 ﾠor	 ﾠso,	 ﾠ[the]	 ﾠimpressionistic	 ﾠ
chroniclers	 ﾠof	 ﾠman’s	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠfoibles	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠjoined	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
experimental	 ﾠpsychologists	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubjecting	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠto	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠ
empirical	 ﾠscrutiny.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfound	 ﾠwould	 ﾠappall	 ﾠAristotle.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Human	 ﾠsubjects,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠappear,	 ﾠregularly	 ﾠand	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠinvoke	 ﾠ
inferential	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgmental	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠranging	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠinvalid	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
genuinely	 ﾠbizarre.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Stich	 ﾠ1985,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ115)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠbiases	 ﾠis	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠenough:	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfinite	 ﾠtime	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmake,	 ﾠand	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠancestors	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠa	 ﾠrapid	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠor	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠfor,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠvery	 ﾠwell	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠadaptive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠto	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ“nonideal”	 ﾠtendencies	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠand	 ﾠacting.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthen	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠinterpret	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhold	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠrational	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossible.27	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Again,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠrests	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠreflections	 ﾠhave	 ﾠput	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠdisplay	 ﾠin	 ﾠStich’s	 ﾠremark,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠevidently	 ﾠ
presupposes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠman	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠmen	 ﾠthink	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOtherwise,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcould	 ﾠit	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠregularly	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠmake	 ﾠinvalid	 ﾠinferences	 ﾠor	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠ
questions	 ﾠon	 ﾠunsound	 ﾠbases?	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠman	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠgeneralization.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠabout	 ﾠour	 ﾠessential	 ﾠnature,	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠnature	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠrational	 ﾠinferences	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
time.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcame	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrizzly	 ﾠbear:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠand	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠessence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠand	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠexhibit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠexist	 ﾠ–	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠexemplification	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠobstacles	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
interferences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠcan	 ﾠproduce,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠsupplies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠ
principle	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠis	 ﾠintelligible.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠas	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠobserves,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
27	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlucid	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠobjection,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠCherniak	 ﾠ1981.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpower	 ﾠfigures	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
successfully	 ﾠactualized,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ“by	 ﾠnegation	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubtraction”	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsuccessfully	 ﾠactualized.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshape	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠby	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
gone	 ﾠawry,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠinterfered	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ(negation)	 ﾠor	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
precondition	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmissing	 ﾠ(subtraction).28	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstatements	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
living	 ﾠthing	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠread	 ﾠas	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠan	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠquantification	 ﾠover	 ﾠ(all	 ﾠor	 ﾠmost)	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠQuantificationalist	 ﾠAssumption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
assumption	 ﾠembodies	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠmisunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠof	 ﾠessentialist	 ﾠclaims.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠessential	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠof	 ﾠhorses	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfour	 ﾠlegs	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsimply:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhorse	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
four	 ﾠlegs)	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfalsified	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthree-ﾭ‐legged	 ﾠhorses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
falsified	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠactual	 ﾠhorses	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpart	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthree	 ﾠlegs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLikewise,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠare	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠessential	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠarticulate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposition,	 ﾠare	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
being,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠevaluate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
part	 ﾠgive	 ﾠcogent	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠinferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
laws	 ﾠof	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠand	 ﾠprobability,	 ﾠor	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠtheory.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠto	 ﾠevaluate	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠis	 ﾠrather	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠare	 ﾠexercised	 ﾠin	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
28	 ﾠSee	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠIX.	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠ1046b13.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠHerder	 ﾠresponds	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠspeech	 ﾠis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠessence	 ﾠas	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings:	 ﾠ
‘But	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsavage	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbears,	 ﾠdid	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlanguage?	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ beings?’	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Certainly!	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Only,	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ all,	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ beings	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ unnatural	 ﾠ
condition!	 ﾠ	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠin	 ﾠdegeneration!	 ﾠ	 ﾠPut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstone	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠplant;	 ﾠwill	 ﾠit	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgrow	 ﾠ
crooked?	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠnature	 ﾠan	 ﾠupwards-ﾭ‐growing	 ﾠplant?	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠdid	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠof	 ﾠstraight	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠitself	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplant	 ﾠentwined	 ﾠ
itself	 ﾠcrookedly	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstone?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Herder	 ﾠ2002,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ93)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠand	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmy	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠhere;	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠme	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠHerder	 ﾠis	 ﾠoffering.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠis:	 ﾠPointing	 ﾠto	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠSs	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠF	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠ
falsify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠessential	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠan	 ﾠS	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠF,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠS’s	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠF	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
intelligible	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠas	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠF	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠunder	 ﾠinterference.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠhelpful	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfallibility,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠacts,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠKern	 ﾠ2006,	 ﾠChs.	 ﾠ6-ﾭ‐8	 ﾠand	 ﾠRödl	 ﾠ2007,	 ﾠCh.	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 31	 ﾠ
thinking,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠcount	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠcount	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠmalfunctions	 ﾠcalling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠexplanation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠnature	 ﾠis	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠoften	 ﾠfail	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
exercise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
never	 ﾠattain	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠwho	 ﾠlack	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpowers:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠpotentiality	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠrealized,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠminds	 ﾠare	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ
defective	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcount	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
defective	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwant	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeliberate,	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ
reasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠbelieves,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠascriptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠto	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠmake	 ﾠreference	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠan	 ﾠideal	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠjust	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
sketching.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
presupposes	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠideal	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpart	 ﾠrational	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
concepts	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠin	 ﾠrepresentations	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠas	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠand	 ﾠacting	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠgrasped	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠthings	 ﾠright	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
distinctive	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠcan	 ﾠget	 ﾠthings	 ﾠright.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
consistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠDavidson	 ﾠsays	 ﾠabout	 ﾠidealization,	 ﾠcharity,	 ﾠetc.;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
captures	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠinsightful	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠview.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠirrationally	 ﾠand	 ﾠact	 ﾠ
irrationally,	 ﾠbut,	 ﾠif	 ﾠDavidson	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠunderwrites	 ﾠour	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
involving	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠirrationally-ﾭ‐efficacious	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠis	 ﾠour	 ﾠgrasp	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
concepts	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠframework	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationalizing	 ﾠexplanation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠput	 ﾠit	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway:	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
believing	 ﾠand	 ﾠacting	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠones	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠin	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“what-ﾭ‐it-ﾭ‐
is-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐be”	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠoften	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠnewspapers	 ﾠand	 ﾠmagazines,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠasserts	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠintent	 ﾠon	 ﾠexalting	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠ
above	 ﾠall	 ﾠother	 ﾠliving	 ﾠcreatures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdefenders	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational-ﾭ‐
nonrational	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhad	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠaims,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠmotive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
philosophical	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠmistaken.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠcomparisons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctively	 ﾠrational	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠmind	 ﾠembodies	 ﾠa	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframework	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠminds,	 ﾠa	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠ
adopting	 ﾠany	 ﾠview	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminds	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠspecies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRoughly	 ﾠstated,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
this:	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠisolable	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠbelonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠmind	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠother	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrealized,	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠunchanged,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
mind	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠthis	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠpower.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠmind	 ﾠthus	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
explained	 ﾠas:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠ
animals,	 ﾠsupplemented	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther,	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠregulate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
light	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠreasoning.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
itself	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠrational	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife.29	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠrational;	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
animals.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.4	 ﾠ To	 ﾠquery	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnivocality	 ﾠAssumption	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠQuantificationalist	 ﾠAssumption	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
yet	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠminds,	 ﾠ
nor	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠto.30	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
29	 ﾠFor	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidea,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ“Tack-ﾭ‐on	 ﾠTheories	 ﾠof	 ﾠRationality:	 ﾠA	 ﾠCritique.”	 ﾠ
30	 ﾠAn	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠissues	 ﾠwould	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin,	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontesting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠan	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠare	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠis	 ﾠgrounded,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠin	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠobservation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
conscious	 ﾠreflection.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠus	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexhibit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠby	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ“What	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠam	 ﾠI?”	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠ
exhibited	 ﾠin	 ﾠeven	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠand	 ﾠform	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
basis	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
beings	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠus	 ﾠcan	 ﾠverify	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠby	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
animal	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire-ﾭ‐governed	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 33	 ﾠ
remove	 ﾠsome	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠobstacles	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠshown	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobstacles	 ﾠ
depend	 ﾠon	 ﾠquestionable	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠof	 ﾠessentialist	 ﾠclaims,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Classical	 ﾠView	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational-ﾭ‐nonrational	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠan	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠdiscover	 ﾠabout	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠby	 ﾠobservation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠappearances	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠaround	 ﾠus,	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmake	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue,	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐conscious,	 ﾠnonobservational	 ﾠ
knowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠourselves.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠcharacterizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠas	 ﾠrational,	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠarticulate	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠby	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠat	 ﾠourselves,	 ﾠbut,	 ﾠso	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak,	 ﾠby	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
ourselves	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠabout	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠminds	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐consciously	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ
minds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠsort.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ–	 ﾠswitching	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠidioms	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“concept	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflection”	 ﾠin	 ﾠKant’s	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠsource	 ﾠlies	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
reflective	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠour	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠ(compare	 ﾠCritique	 ﾠof	 ﾠPure	 ﾠReason,	 ﾠA260/B316).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠrational	 ﾠnature	 ﾠis,	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠunderwrites	 ﾠKant’s	 ﾠ
confidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnature	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvestigated	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠand	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠby	 ﾠphilosophy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
remarks	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠCritique:	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ nothing	 ﾠ save	 ﾠ reason	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ pure	 ﾠ thinking;	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ obtain	 ﾠ
knowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠfar	 ﾠafield,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠI	 ﾠcome	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
self.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Kant	 ﾠ1998,	 ﾠAxiv)	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠonly	 ﾠsketch	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgrounding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠin	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
31	 ﾠFor	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠto	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠdrafts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠindebted	 ﾠto	 ﾠaudiences	 ﾠat	 ﾠAuburn	 ﾠUniversity,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
University	 ﾠof	 ﾠChicago,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUniversität	 ﾠLeipzig.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠgrateful	 ﾠto	 ﾠDorit	 ﾠBar-ﾭ‐On,	 ﾠJim	 ﾠConant,	 ﾠ
Matthias	 ﾠHaase,	 ﾠSean	 ﾠKelsey,	 ﾠEric	 ﾠMarcus,	 ﾠSebastian	 ﾠRödl,	 ﾠand	 ﾠPirimin	 ﾠStekeler-ﾭ‐Weithofer	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcomments	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠadvice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ
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